

**Working time, satisfaction and work life balance:
A European perspective.**

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Abstract

Using three different measures for satisfaction, I investigate gender-specific differences in working time mismatch. While male satisfaction with life or job is slightly not effected by working more or less hours, only over-time lowers male work life balance significantly. Women are more sensitive to the amount of working hours. They prefer part-time employment and are dissatisfied with both changes towards over-time and under-time.

Keywords: Working Hours, Gender Differences, Work Life Balance, European Social Survey (ESS 2012)

JEL classification: J22 (Time Allocation and Labor Supply), I31 (General Welfare, Well-Being), J16 (Economics of Gender)

Introduction

This paper deals with the nexus of well-being and provided working hours. Here, I use information on life satisfaction (LS), job satisfaction (JS), and work life balance (WLB). The question of interest in the paper is how an individual is affected by working more or less hours than the contractual fixed amount. All models are estimated separately for men and women to catch up gender differences in satisfaction¹ and work life balance. Using the recently published 2012 wave of the European Social Survey (ESS 2012)² I present insights from pooled industrialized countries.

Although there is no clear definition of WLB, psychologists describe the potential conflict between paid working hours on the labor market, and paid or non-paid working hours at the household, such as caring time, and leisure time. This can influence general, job or family specific satisfaction (Bulger 2014). In this context especially women and mothers may face multiple burdens WLB is close to the more psychological concept of work to family conflicts, or family to work conflicts. Survey articles such as Guest (2002) and Lewis et al. (2007) provide deeper insights from a psychological perspective.

In table 1 I start with cross-country findings from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2013) for two factors which effect individual WLB. One one hand a substantial part of a countries' labor force works more than 50 hours per week. One the other hand men and women have around 14 to 15 hours a day for private

¹See Drobnič et al. (2010), Hauret and Williams (2013), or Humpert (2010, 2014b) for analyzes of life and job satisfaction in several European countries with transnational survey data.

² I use the data version 1.2 with corrected values for Hungary.

purpose activities, such as leisure time or care.

Table 1 here

The key finding of the paper is that males and females suffer differently from working time mismatch. Males LS and JS is not effected by over-time, while females react with dissatisfaction. Analyzing WLB direct shows that males and females suffer from a shift from leisure time towards working time. However, females are more sensitive. This can be explained by the multiple burdens of paid work and household production, especially by caring children.

The paper is structured like that. After this introduction, I give a literature review (2), and discuss the data and the used methods are described in section 3. In section 4 and 5 the results are presented and discussed.

2. References from the Literature

Booth and van Ours (2008) show in an influential paper that British partnered men and women behave different in terms of working hours and JS. In general women report lower levels of JS. The authors use the BHPS panel data and present clear evidence, that male JS or LS are not affected by the size of hours worked, while their satisfaction with working hours is the highest at full time work level respectively 40 hours per week. Nevertheless, over-time work is dissatisfying. Women, however have their highest level of JS and satisfaction with working hours at the part time level. The results for women

lead to the hypotheses that they should prefer part time work, but LS as a whole remain not affected. In a similar paper Booth and van Ours (2013) replicate these results with Dutch data. Here women working part-time report their highest levels of JS.

With Australian Hilda panel data Wooden et al. (2009) analyze the effects of working time mismatch on JS. They present two key findings: at first not the number of hours worked, but any mismatch between preferred and realized hours lower JS. Second, they show that both, working more or working fewer hours than contractual fixed are dissatisfying, as well. However, the effect of working over-time is the larger one.

Wunder and Heineck (2013) use German SOEP panel data to show that working time mismatch reduces LS. Women with full-time working husbands report their highest satisfaction with life, while males remain not effected of their wife's provided working hours. Contrary to other studies, they present clear evidence that under-time harms more than over-time. While occupational sex segregation declines in Germany on the long-run, Humpert (2014a) shows that segregation remains higher in the former socialistic part of Eastern Germany. Although, this finding is observable for full-time and part-time work, segregation is always lower in part-time employment.

Using U.S. data, Tausig and Fenwick (2001) discuss several variables who affect an individual's WLB. While working over-time or working at the weekend reduces the WLB, union membership increases it. A somehow surprising result is, that there exist no gender specific differences, while the presence of young children reduces the WLB in general.

Pereira and Coelho (2013) show with pooled ESS data³ that interruption in carrier, such as times of former unemployment lower job satisfaction. But is there is evidence, that autonomy in the daily working routing, a large firm size and a non-fixed working contract will increase job satisfaction.

Hofäcker and König (2013) use the 2010 ESS wave and analyze three psychological measures on WLB⁴. Although, only a few country groups have significant coefficients, the authors show that in Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon countries people report the lowest conflicts between working and leisure time.

In this context health is an important factor. In review articles Sparks et al. (1997), and Bassanini and Caroli (2014) analyze the nexus between working time and physical or mental health. They show a non-linear relation between these two characteristics. Working more or less hours than expected has both negative effects, especially psychological. An important factor in coping with under- or over-time is a personal influence in making decision.

However productivity effects on the firm level, provide only mixed evidences. While Konrad and Mangel (2000) show higher productivity of firm, who provide WLB methods to the employees, Bloom et al (2009) show no effect. Here controlling for management stile turns the coefficients from positive to zero.

3 Here, the 2002, 2004, and 2006 waves of the ESS data were pooled as one data set.

4 The information on satisfaction with WLB was used in earlier waves, e.g. by Ylikännö (2010) for four Scandinavian countries.

3. Data and Empirical Model

I use the recently published 2012 wave of the European Social Survey (ESS 2012), an international social-economic cross-section data set. The data includes 44,257 individuals from 24 industrialized countries⁵. For my analysis I only exclude the Kosovo⁶ which is neither a member states of the EU nor the OECD, and limit the data to 12,759 employed individuals (6,329 men and 6,430 women) on an age range between 18 and 65 years. There are three similar questions on individual LS, JS, and WLB. The questions are the following:

“All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays?”

“All things considered, how satisfied are you with your present job?”⁷

“How satisfied are you with the balance between the time you spend on your paid work and the time you spend on other aspects of your life?”

They had to be answered on a typical Likert-skale from 0 to 10, where 0 means extremely dissatisfied and 10 extremely satisfied. For the dependent variable I collapse the scales from 0 to 10 into binary scales. This information is grouped at their means. Therefore the dummies turn to zero when satisfaction is reported from 0 to 7 (not satisfied), and into one (satisfied) for values between 8 to 10. Recoding the longer scale into a binary variable is a usual procedure. This is used e.g. in earlier papers by Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew (2009), Hauret and Williams (2013), or Humpert

5 These countries are Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Kosovo, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.

6 The Russian Federation was invited by the OECD to participate in 2007.

7 If respondents have several jobs, they should answer about the main one.

(2013).

The main independent variables are working time specific. At first, I use the coding presented by Booth and van Ours (2008) and recode the working hours inclusive paid and unpaid over-time into four dummy variables. These are the following: small part-time (1 to 15 hours per week), large part-time (16 to 29 hours), full-time (30 to 40 hours), and over-time (more than 40 hours). This assumption is appropriate, because on average males in the sample work around 42 hours a week and females around 38 hours. However, it is obvious that especially males are underrepresented in the group less than 15 hours per week. See table 2 for the distribution of working hours per country and gender.

Table 2 here

At second, I compute new dummy variables for the difference between regular working hours and contractual working hours. This allows information on more or less worked hours. The reference group is having no calculated differences. For robustness reasons I use the same information as the numeric difference. The other controls are related to social-economic and employment specific conditions. The social-economic controls are age, age squared, education level, having children, having a partner and citizenship of the individual country observed. The employment related controls are fixed contract, having influence on daily work, supervision of employees, working in public sector, union membership, ever been unemployment and household income from work. Country specific dummies control for macroeconomic differences. These are not

discussed. The descriptive statistics separated for males and females are presented in table 3.

Table 3 here

I perform binary probit estimations with marginal effects. These are the percentage changes when a dummy turns from zero to one, while all other variables are hold constant. Following the data set description by ESS (2012) the use of design weights is obligatory. The general estimation equation is the following:

$$satisfaction_i = a_0 + a_1 working\ time_i + X_i b + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

For every individual i the LS or JS, or satisfaction with WLB are regressed on a set of dummy variables on working time regimes, or on over- and under-time ($a_1 working\ time_i$) and a vector of individual social-economic and employment specific characteristics $X_i b$. Epsilon (ε_i) presents the residuum.

4. Results

As expected men and women differ in terms of LS, JS, WLB, and working hours.

At first, there are rather no effects for males on any satisfaction. The results are presented in table 4. There is weak evidence that male LS is effected by working hours.

While working more than 40 hours a week increases LS positive with 10 percent, neither dummies for over- or under-time nor the number of additional hours have any

statistical effect. This is similar to the results for JS. Again, males are not affected by any differences in working hours. However, the results change for WLB. Here working more than 40 hours a week lowers WLB with -14 percent. The regression with dummies for over- and under-time show similar results with -12,5 percent for over-time. The reference is a dummy for no calculated difference between actual and contractual working hours. At third, a change in the number of working hours lowers WLB with -1 percent. All these coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level.

All other controls show results in line with the literature findings. While LS and JS have a u-shaped age profile, WLB do not differ with age. The size of household income is always positive for any satisfaction or WLB. While dummies for private sector employment and especially control on own work routines increase any satisfaction or WLB, past unemployment decrease it. Having a leading position at the work place affects only JS positive.

Table 4 here

The results for women differ towards the male results above. While the three dummies for working hour groups provide no results, dummies for under- and over-time both show negative effects on LS. Here, doing fewer hours on the labor market lowers LS with 10 percent, while doing more hours lowers it with 4 percent. Again numeric differences in working hours provide no statistical evidence. The results for JS show much clearer effects. Working 30 to 40 hours or more than 40 hours a week lower female JS with -7, respectively -10 percent. Doing under- or over-time provide similar results. Relative to the no calculated differences, over-time lowers JS with -3 percent.

Again, change in the number of working hours has no statistical effect.

Female WLB is more sensitive to working time differences than male WLB. Here, dummies for working 30 to 40 hours lower WLB with -19 percent. Doing more than 40 hours a week is even more negative with -30 percent. Dummies for under- and over-time are both negative effected, relative to no difference. Doing less hours lowers WLB with -8 percent, while doing more hours lowers it with -14 percent. Similar to male WLB, a change in the number of working hours lowers WLB by -1 percent.

Again, the controls show the expected results. While LS and JS have a u-shaped age profile, WLB do not differ with age. The size of household income is positive for any satisfaction or WLB. Private sector employment affects LS and JS, but no WLB. Having control to own work routines has a highly significant positive effect, while past unemployment decrease any type of satisfaction or WLB. Women are slightly negative affected by children in the household in terms of LS and WLB, but not of JS. A leading position at the work place has even mixed results for women. It increases JS, but lowers WLB.

Table 5 here

In the next step I repeat the analysis with a smaller sub sample. I substitute the dummy variable of being partnered or not, towards the number of working hours of an individual's partner. This is closer to the idea described by Booth and van Ours (2008, 2013), and Wunder and Heineck (2013). However, the number of observation is lowered to the half, because single households and non-employed partners are dropped. Now

6,915 observations remain, with 3,406 men and 3,509 women. While the (female) partners of males provide 35.6 working hours a week to the labor market on the average, (male) partners of females work with 42.1 hours much longer.⁸ Table 6 and 7 show the estimation results, separately for men and women.

The male results are quite similar to those of table 4. None of the three types of working hours are affected by LS. This is similar to the results for JS. Neither the dummies for working hours, nor the dummies for under- or over-time are affected. However, by using the calculated difference in the numbers of hours shows a positive and highly significant result. Here, a change in the number of working hours increases JS by 1 percent. Once again, males' results slightly change for WLB. Although, dummies for working hours are not affected, the dummy for over-time turns towards -13 percent. At third, a change in the number of working hours lowers WLB with -1 percent. As reported in the earlier section, all other controls for males show results in line with the literature findings.

Table 6 here

The female results for the restricted sample in table 6 are similar to the earlier one. While the three dummies for working hour groups provide no results, dummies for under- and over-time both show negative effects on LS. Here, doing fewer hours on the labor market lowers LS with 10 percent, while doing more hours lowers it with 4 percent. Again numeric differences in working hours provide no statistical evidence.

⁸ There is no identification of a partner's gender type. So I assume that the most of the couples in the data should be heterosexual men and women.

The results for JS show much clearer effects. Working 30 to 40 hours or more than 40 hours a week lower female JS with -8, respectively -12 percent. Doing less working hours lowers JS by -15 percent, while working more remains at a level of -4 percent. A numeric change in the number of working hours has no effect.

The results for female WLB are even larger and more sensitive to working time differences than in table 5. Here, dummies for working 30 to 40 hours lower WLB by -22 percent. Doing more than 40 hours a week is even more negative with -35 percent. Dummies for under- and over-time are both negative effected, relative to no difference. Doing fewer hours lowers WLB with -10 percent, while doing more hours lowers it with -15 percent. Again a change in the number of working hours lowers WLB with -1 percent. Again the controls support the findings discussed above.

Table 7 here

5. Conclusion and Limitations

In the estimation presented above I use different measures of satisfaction and WLB to analyze if and how an individual's life is affected by working more or less hours than preferred. The key finding of the paper is that males and females suffer differently from any working time mismatch.

In terms of LS, and JS males are slightly uninfected by working shorter or longer than contractual fixed. However, the WLB measure shows that males suffer from over-time, because of the loss in leisure time. Women seem to be more sensitive towards

differences in working hours. Here LS is both negative effected by under- and over-time. However, effects of working fewer hours are even larger. The results for JS and WLB show that women seem to prefer part-time employment. Relative to working small part-time, full-time and doing over-time both lower JS significantly. The results for WLB regressions are larger each time. By using direct dummies for working extra or less hours, under-time has larger negative effects in estimations of JS, but lowers in estimations of WLB. The results for females may be explained by a multiple burden of paid work and household production, especially by raising and caring children. This finding is supported by lowering effects of carrier variables, such as having a leading position.

However, there are some limitations of the study. At first, I am only able to use cross-section and cross-country information. Therefore, any answers towards question of causality are difficult to answer. Second, because of limited numbers of observation per country, I can only use the cross-country information as a control. The use of country specific data may foster the presented result. However, the overall effects are in line with the literature findings on LS, JS, and WLB.

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Tables in Text

Table 1: OECD (2013): Better Life Index (Measures for Work Life Balance), *=2011, **=full time employment, 2012

	BE	CZ	DE	EE	FI	DE	HU	IS	IE	IL	IT	NL	NO	PL	PT	SK	SI	ES	SE	CH	UK	RU
All																						
Share (%) of employees working > 50 hours a week*	4.43	7.58	1.97	4.10	3.89	5.41	3.10	13.45	3.94	17.58	4.07	0.66	2.83	7.24	8.50	6.38	5.55	6.34	1.23	5.87	12.06	0.16
Amount of daily hours for leisure and care**	15.10	14.34	16.06	14.2	14.89	15.31	14.90	14.06	15.18	13.81	14.89	15.66	15.56	14.20	14.71	14.78	14.62	15.85	15.11	14.78	14.83	14.84
Males																						
Share (%) of employees working > 50 hours a week*	6.56	11.19	3.08	5.62	5.96	8.18	4.64	18.94	6.67	26.91	5.70	1.12	4.46	11.32	11.64	9.34	7.93	8.85	1.85	8.68	18.12	0.25
Amount of daily hours for leisure and care**	15.82	14.51	16.06	14.54	15.03	15.36	15.04	14.24	15.31	14.01	15.19	15.76	15.50	14.37	14.86	14.93	15.08	16.21	15.01	14.93	14.83	14.99
Females																						
Share (%) of employees working > 50 hours a week*	2.12	3.29	0.83	2.72	1.88	2.39	1.49	7.05	1.47	7.91	2.03	0.15	1.13	2.57	5.33	2.99	2.95	3.53	0.60	2.86	5.83	0.08
Amount of daily hours for leisure and care**	15.47	14.07	16.06	13.85	14.66	15.31	14.67	13.77	14.97	13.5	14.08	15.49	15.67	13.83	14.47	14.54	14.12	15.28	15.3	14.54	14.83	14.61

Source: OECD (2013), <http://stats.oecd.org/>.

Table 2: Means working hours by country and gender

Country	All: Mean (Std. Dev.)	Males: Mean (Std. Dev.)	Females: Mean (Std. Dev.)
BE	38.14 (0.421)	41.54 (0.581)	34.50 (0.544)
BG	42.56 (0.402)	43.77 (0.584)	41.32 (0.540)
CH	41.52 (0.463)	42.48 (0.734)	40.48 (0.533)
CY	40.41 (0.284)	42.40 (0.355)	38.44 (0.420)
CZ	42.22 (0.373)	44.15 (0.597)	40.98 (0.467)
DE	38.23 (0.556)	39.01 (0.827)	37.69 (0.746)
DK	43.85 (0.443)	46.67 (0.582)	40.52 (0.613)
EE	39.22 (0.330)	41.48 (0.434)	36.43 (0.470)
ES	35.52 (0.412)	49.23 (0.452)	30.39 (0.587)
FI	42.74 (0.849)	48.10 (1.175)	37.91 (1.059)
GB	41.03 (0.665)	48.09 (0.954)	35.73 (0.764)
HU	37.21 (0.510)	40.42 (0.628)	34.46 (0.736)
IE	41.20 (0.295)	42.14 (0.402)	40.37 (0.420)
IL	37.61 (0.509)	42.61 (0.701)	33.91 (0.653)
IS	38.99 (0.235)	40.53 (0.330)	37.33 (0.317)
NL	40.73 (0.457)	43.40 (0.552)	37.74 (0.697)
NO	42.38 (0.329)	44.32 (0.522)	40.77 (0.403)
PL	37.80 (0.3439)	39.99 (0.503)	35.44 (0.428)
PT	39.61 (0.347)	43.36 (0.396)	35.04 (0.533)
RU	43.89 (0.264)	44.40 (0.359)	43.26 (0.386)
SE	40.35 (0.689)	42.46 (1.047)	38.38 (0.867)
SI	38.96 (0.467)	43.90 (0.473)	32.89 (0.711)
SK	42.06 (0.282)	42.99 (.462)	41.35 (0.347)
Sample Mean	40.07 (0.087)	42.79 (0.1169)	37.39 (0.123)

Source: ESS 2012, own calculation, with design weights.

Table 3: Description Statistics

Variable	Males					Females				
	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
LS	6,329	0.567	0.495	0	1	6,430	0.560	0.497	0	1
JS	6,329	0.594	0.491	0	1	6,430	0.590	0.492	0	1
WLB	6,329	0.419	0.493	0	1	6,430	0.418	0.493	0	1
15 to 29 Hours	6,329	0.031	0.174	0	1	6,430	0.132	0.338	0	1
30 to 40 Hours	6,329	0.477	0.499	0	1	6,430	0.566	0.496	0	1
Over 40 Hours	6,329	0.479	0.500	0	1	6,430	0.266	0.442	0	1
Under-Time	6,329	0.021	0.145	0	1	6,430	0.021	0.144	0	1
Over-Time	6,329	0.464	0.498	0	1	6,430	0.353	0.478	0	1
Diff. Hours	6,329	3.599	7.039	-45	75	6,430	2.216	5.440	-40	48
Age	6,329	42.107	11.618	18	65	6,430	42.707	11.322	18	65
Age Square	6,329	1,907.959	983.471	324	4,225	6,430	1,952.073	966.527	324	4,225
Citizen	6,329	0.945	0.228	0	1	6,430	0.959	0.196	0	1
Education Medium	6,329	0.521	0.500	0	1	6,430	0.432	0.495	0	1
Education High	6,329	0.389	0.488	0	1	6,430	0.481	0.499	0	1
Partner at HH	6,329	0.716	0.451	0	1	6,430	0.651	0.476	0	1
Children at HH	6,329	0.488	0.500	0	1	6,430	0.542	0.498	0	1
Index HH Income	6,329	6.654	2.418	1	10	6,430	6.269	2.537	1	10
Fixed Contract	6,329	0.121	0.327	0	1	6,430	0.136	0.343	0	1
Public Sector	6,329	0.283	0.450	0	1	6,430	0.461	0.498	0	1
Control of Work	6,329	0.523	0.499	0	1	6,430	0.513	0.499	0	1
Leading Position	6,329	0.370	0.483	0	1	6,430	0.260	0.439	0	1
Union Membership	6,329	0.359	0.480	0	1	6,430	0.377	0.485	0	1
Ever Unemployed	6,329	0.299	0.455	0	1	6,430	0.279	0.449	0	1

Source: ESS 2012, own calculation, with design weights.

Table 4: Results of Satisfaction with Life, Job and WLB for Males (Std. Errors)

Variable	LS	JS	WLB	LS	JS	WLB	LS	JS	WLB
Ref. Under 15 Hours	/	/	/						
15 to 29 Hours	-0.011 (0.072)	0.006 (0.069)	0.035 (0.071)						
30 to 40 Hours	0.097 (0.611)	0.086 (0.060)	-0.004 (0.060)						
Over 40 Hours	0.101* (0.614)	0.096 (0.060)	-0.142*** (0.06)						
Ref. Diff.=0				/	/	/			
Under-Time				-0.025 (0.051)	0.029 (0.047)	0.070 (0.048)			
Over-Time				-0.006 (0.015)	0.005 (0.015)	-0.125*** (0.014)			
Diff. Hours							-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.008*** (0.001)
Age	-0.024*** (0.005)	-0.014*** (0.005)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.022*** (0.005)	-0.012*** (0.005)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.022*** (0.005)	-0.012*** (0.005)	-0.008 (0.005)
Age Square	0.001*** (0.001)	0.001*** (0.001)	0.001** (0.001)	0.001*** (0.001)	0.001*** (0.001)	0.001** (0.001)	0.001** (0.001)	0.001*** (0.001)	0.001*** (0.001)
Citizen =Yes	0.042 (0.032)	0.036 (0.031)	0.030 (0.029)	0.043 (0.032)	0.036 (0.030)	0.035 (0.030)	0.042 (0.032)	0.037 (0.030)	0.035 (0.029)
Ref: Education Low									
Education Medium	0.012 (0.026)	-0.007 (0.025)	-0.016 (0.025)	0.011 (0.026)	-0.008 (0.025)	-0.010 (0.025)	0.011 (0.026)	-0.008 (0.025)	-0.016 (0.025)
Education High	0.035 (0.026)	-0.028 (0.027)	-0.023 (0.027)	0.034 (0.027)	-0.029 (0.027)	-0.007 (0.027)	0.033 (0.027)	-0.030 (0.027)	-0.020 (0.026)
Partner at HH =Yes	0.132*** (0.019)	0.001 (0.018)	0.008 (0.018)	0.132*** (0.020)	0.001 (0.018)	0.006 (0.018)	0.131*** (0.020)	0.001 (0.018)	0.003 (0.018)
Children at HH =Yes	-0.016 (0.178)	-0.005 (0.017)	-0.031** (0.017)	-0.017 (0.018)	-0.005 (0.017)	-0.030** (0.017)	-0.017 (0.018)	-0.006 (0.017)	-0.031** (0.017)
Index HH Income	0.034*** (0.004)	0.023*** (0.003)	0.016*** (0.003)	0.035*** (0.004)	0.024*** (0.003)	0.014*** (0.003)	0.035*** (0.003)	0.024*** (0.003)	0.014*** (0.003)
Fixed Contract =Yes	-0.001 (0.023)	0.001 (0.021)	-0.014 (0.021)	-0.002 (0.023)	0.001 (0.021)	-0.012 (0.021)	-0.002 (0.023)	-0.002 (0.033)	-0.011 (0.021)
Public Sector=Yes	0.038*** (0.016)	0.069*** (0.015)	0.065*** (0.016)	0.034*** (0.016)	0.065*** (0.015)	0.071*** (0.016)	0.034*** (0.016)	0.065*** (0.015)	0.071*** (0.016)
Control of Work = Yes	0.123*** (0.015)	0.212*** (0.015)	0.156*** (0.015)	0.123*** (0.015)	0.212*** (0.014)	0.152*** (0.015)	0.123*** (0.015)	0.212*** (0.015)	0.151*** (0.015)
Leading Position =Yes	0.007 (0.016)	0.037*** (0.015)	-0.020 (0.015)	0.011 (0.016)	0.039*** (0.015)	-0.026* (0.015)	0.010 (0.016)	0.040*** (0.015)	-0.027* (0.015)
Union Membership =Yes	-0.028* (0.017)	-0.007 (0.017)	0.011 (0.017)	-0.027 (0.017)	-0.005 (0.017)	0.013 (0.017)	-0.027 (0.018)	-0.005 (0.017)	0.013 (0.017)
Ever Unemployed =Yes	-0.077*** (0.016)	-0.061*** (0.015)	-0.041*** (0.015)	-0.079*** (0.016)	-0.062*** (0.015)	-0.037*** (0.015)	-0.079*** (0.016)	-0.062*** (0.015)	-0.039*** (0.015)
County	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
Pseudo R-Squared	0.182	0.092	0.061	0.181	0.091	0.059	0.181	0.091	0.059

Source: ESS 2012, own calculation, probit estimation with marginal effects, with design weights, levels of significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, N=6,329.

Table 5: Results of Satisfaction with Life, Job and WLB for Females (Std. Errors)

Variable	LS	JS	WLB	LS	JS	WLB	LS	JS	WLB
Ref. Under 15 Hours	/	/	/						
15 to 29 Hours	0.065 (0.041)	-0.002 (0.039)	-0.003 (0.037)						
30 to 40 Hours	-0.006 (0.039)	-0.069** (0.037)	-0.188*** (0.036)						
Over 40 Hours	-0.015 (0.040)	-0.095*** (0.039)	-0.305*** (0.031)						
Ref. Diff.=0				/	/	/			
Under-Time				-0.096** (0.052)	-0.042 (0.052)	-0.084* (0.044)			
Over-Time				-0.036*** (0.016)	-0.025* (0.015)	-0.143*** (0.015)			
Diff. Hours							-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.012*** (0.002)
Age	-0.019*** (0.005)	-0.015*** (0.005)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.019*** (0.005)	-0.016*** (0.005)	-0.010*** (0.005)	-0.019*** (0.005)	-0.016*** (0.005)	-0.011*** (0.005)
Age Square	0.001*** (0.001)	0.001*** (0.001)	0.001*(0.001)	0.001*** (0.001)	0.001*** (0.001)	0.001*** (0.001)	0.001*** (0.001)	0.001*** (0.001)	0.001*** (0.001)
Citizen =Yes	0.058 (0.037)	0.073*** (0.036)	0.047 (0.033)	0.060* (0.037)	0.077*** (0.036)	0.059* (0.033)	0.059 (0.037)	0.076*** (0.035)	0.054 (0.033)
Ref: Education Low									
Education Medium	0.023 (0.028)	-0.015 (0.025)	0.030 (0.026)	0.020 (0.028)	-0.019 (0.025)	0.017 (0.026)	0.022 (0.028)	-0.018 (0.026)	0.018 (0.026)
Education High	0.059*** (0.029)	0.001 (0.027)	0.014 (0.027)	0.059*** (0.029)	-0.004 (0.027)	0.002 (0.027)	0.057** (0.029)	-0.006 (0.027)	-0.001 (0.027)
Partner at HH =Yes	0.081*** (0.017)	-0.016 (0.016)	-0.026 (0.016)	0.083*** (0.017)	-0.013 (0.016)	-0.015 (0.016)	0.085*** (0.017)	-0.012 (0.016)	-0.010 (0.016)
Children at HH =Yes	-0.032** (0.017)	0.009 (0.016)	-0.034*** (0.003)	-0.026 (0.017)	0.017 (0.016)	-0.008 (0.016)	-0.025 (0.017)	0.017 (0.016)	-0.008 (0.015)
Index HH Income	0.027*** (0.004)	0.015*** (0.003)	0.008*** (0.003)	0.027*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.003)	0.006*** (0.003)	0.026*** (0.003)	0.014*** (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)
Fixed Contract =Yes	-0.032 (0.023)	0.001 (0.020)	0.016 (0.020)	-0.029 (0.022)	0.005 (0.020)	0.027 (0.021)	-0.028 (0.022)	0.005 (0.020)	0.029 (0.020)
Public Sector=Yes	0.027* (0.016)	0.041*** (0.015)	0.007 (0.014)	0.029* (0.016)	0.042*** (0.015)	0.014 (0.015)	0.029** (0.015)	0.042*** (0.014)	0.014 (0.015)
Control of Work = Yes	0.115*** (0.015)	0.240*** (0.014)	0.168*** (0.014)	0.114*** (0.015)	0.238*** (0.013)	0.160*** (0.014)	0.113*** (0.015)	0.237*** (0.014)	0.158*** (0.014)
Leading Position =Yes	0.007 (0.018)	0.032** (0.017)	-0.033*** (0.016)	0.006 (0.017)	0.026 (0.016)	-0.051*** (0.016)	0.001 (0.017)	0.023 (0.016)	-0.059 (0.016)
Union Membership =Yes	-0.032* (0.018)	0.004 (0.017)	0.003 (0.017)	-0.034* (0.018)	0.001 (0.018)	-0.007 (0.017)	-0.034** (0.018)	0.001 (0.018)	-0.002 (0.017)
Ever Unemployed =Yes	-0.059*** (0.017)	-0.048*** (0.016)	-0.038*** (0.015)	-0.057*** (0.016)	-0.047*** (0.016)	-0.034*** (0.015)	-0.058*** (0.017)	-0.047*** (0.016)	-0.034*** (0.015)
County	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
Pseudo R-Squared	0.195	0.093	0.078	0.195	0.092	0.063	0.194	0.091	0.061

Source: ESS 2012, own calculation, probit estimation with marginal effects, with design weights, levels of significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, N=6,430.

Table 6: Results of Satisfaction with Life, Job and WLB for Males (Std. Errors) : Control for a partner's provided working hours

Variable	LS	JS	WLB	LS	JS	WLB	LS	JS	WLB
Ref. Under 15 Hours	/	/	/						
15 to 29 Hours	0.007 (0.105)	0.059 (0.099)	0.170 (0.105)						
30 to 40 Hours	0.128 (0.091)	0.104 (0.092)	0.090 (0.095)						
Over 40 Hours	0.143 (0.093)	0.121 (0.093)	-0.074 (0.095)						
Ref. Diff.=0				/	/	/			
Under-Time				-0.068 (0.066)	0.027 (0.063)	-0.001 (0.061)			
Over-Time				0.011 (0.020)	0.020 (0.019)	-0.130*** (0.020)			
Diff. Hours							0.001 (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	-0.009*** (0.002)
Age	-0.027*** (0.008)	-0.014* (0.008)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.025*** (0.008)	-0.013 (0.008)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.025*** (0.009)	-0.013 (0.008)	0.002 (0.008)
Age Square	0.001*** (0.001)	0.001** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001*** (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	0.001*** (0.001)	0.001*** (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	0.001*** (0.001)
Citizen =Yes	0.032 (0.047)	0.022 (0.045)	0.027 (0.044)	0.028 (0.047)	0.021 (0.045)	0.039 (0.044)	0.029 (0.047)	0.019 (0.045)	0.036 (0.044)
Ref: Education Low									
Education Medium	0.034 (0.037)	-0.003 (0.037)	0.032 (0.038)	0.029 (0.037)	-0.005 (0.038)	0.038 (0.038)	0.031 (0.037)	-0.006 (0.038)	0.034 (0.038)
Education High	0.050 (0.039)	-0.038 (0.040)	0.031 (0.040)	0.043 (0.039)	-0.042 (0.040)	0.047 (0.040)	0.046 (0.039)	-0.043 (0.040)	0.036 (0.039)
Working Hours Partner	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Children at HH =Yes	-0.012 (0.022)	-0.013 (0.022)	-0.057*** (0.022)	-0.012 (0.022)	-0.014 (0.022)	-0.054*** (0.022)	-0.012 (0.022)	-0.013 (0.022)	-0.055*** (0.022)
Index HH Income	0.033** (0.005)	0.022** (0.005)	0.014** (0.005)	0.034** (0.005)	0.022** (0.005)	0.012** (0.005)	0.034** (0.005)	0.022** (0.005)	0.012** (0.005)
Fixed Contract =Yes	-0.059* (0.035)	-0.083*** (0.034)	-0.024 (0.034)	-0.063* (0.035)	-0.085*** (0.034)	-0.020 (0.034)	-0.063* (0.035)	-0.087*** (0.034)	-0.015 (0.034)
Public Sector=Yes	0.050*** (0.021)	0.075*** (0.020)	0.067*** (0.022)	0.046*** (0.021)	0.073*** (0.020)	0.074*** (0.012)	0.046*** (0.021)	0.074*** (0.020)	0.076*** (0.021)
Control of Work = Yes	0.106*** (0.021)	0.192*** (0.020)	0.152*** (0.021)	0.106*** (0.020)	0.193*** (0.020)	0.148*** (0.021)	0.107*** (0.020)	0.192*** (0.020)	0.149*** (0.021)
Leading Position =Yes	0.016 (0.021)	0.043*** (0.020)	-0.023 (0.021)	0.019 (0.020)	0.045*** (0.020)	-0.031 (0.021)	0.020 (0.020)	0.042*** (0.020)	-0.031 (0.021)
Union Membership =Yes	-0.018 (0.023)	-0.025 (0.022)	-0.002 (0.023)	-0.018 (0.023)	-0.024 (0.022)	-0.001 (0.023)	-0.018 (0.023)	-0.024 (0.022)	-0.001 (0.023)
Ever Unemployed =Yes	-0.063*** (0.022)	-0.045*** (0.021)	-0.023 (0.021)	-0.065*** (0.022)	-0.046*** (0.020)	-0.017 (0.021)	-0.065*** (0.023)	-0.045*** (0.021)	-0.019 (0.021)
County	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
Pseudo R-Squared	0.185	0.084	0.071	0.183	0.084	0.064	0.183	0.085	0.063

Source: ESS 2012, own calculation, probit estimation with marginal effects, with design weights, levels of significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, N=3,406.

Table 7: Results of Satisfaction with Life, Job and WLB for Females (Std. Errors) : Control for a partner's provided working hours

Variable	LS	JS	WLB	LS	JS	WLB	LS	JS	WLB
Ref. Under 15 Hours	/	/	/						
15 to 29 Hours	0.057 (0.048)	-0.022 (0.052)	-0.049 (0.051)						
30 to 40 Hours	-0.011 (0.048)	-0.080* (0.049)	-0.220*** (0.048)						
Over 40 Hours	-0.015 (0.051)	-0.123** (0.053)	-0.350*** (0.040)						
Ref. Diff.=0				/	/	/			
Under-Time				-0.105* (0.061)	-0.148** (0.061)	-0.103* (0.057)			
Over-Time				-0.039* (0.020)	-0.043** (0.020)	-0.149*** (0.019)			
Diff. Hours							-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.012*** (0.002)
Age	-0.037*** (0.008)	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.037*** (0.008)	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.037*** (0.008)	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.011 (0.008)
Age Square	0.001*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	0.001*** (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)
Citizen =Yes	0.092* (0.050)	0.081* (0.047)	0.028 (0.045)	0.094** (0.049)	0.086* (0.047)	0.050 (0.045)	0.093* (0.049)	0.086* (0.047)	0.042 (0.045)
Ref: Education Low									
Education Medium	0.068* (0.036)	-0.011 (0.036)	0.067* (0.037)	0.068* (0.036)	-0.014 (0.036)	0.060 (0.037)	0.069** (0.036)	-0.012 (0.036)	0.064 (0.045)
Education High	0.106*** (0.038)	0.012 (0.038)	0.048 (0.038)	0.109*** (0.038)	0.008 (0.037)	0.041 (0.038)	0.107*** (0.038)	0.006 (0.037)	0.040 (0.038)
Working Hours Partner	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)
Children at HH =Yes	0.019 (0.023)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.043* (0.022)	0.025 (0.023)	0.010 (0.022)	-0.011 (0.022)	0.025 (0.023)	0.011 (0.022)	-0.012 (0.022)
Index HH Income	0.034** (0.005)	0.019** (0.005)	0.012** (0.005)	0.034** (0.005)	0.018** (0.005)	0.010** (0.005)	0.034** (0.005)	0.018*** (0.005)	0.008** (0.005)
Fixed Contract =Yes	-0.063*** (0.030)	0.003 (0.027)	0.022 (0.029)	-0.061** (0.030)	0.005 (0.027)	0.027 (0.029)	-0.059** (0.030)	0.058 (0.280)	0.031 (0.028)
Public Sector=Yes	-0.007 (0.021)	0.030 (0.019)	-0.018 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.020)	0.032* (0.019)	-0.011 (0.020)	-0.006 (0.021)	0.031 (0.019)	-0.012 (0.020)
Control of Work = Yes	0.102*** (0.200)	0.225*** (0.019)	0.167*** (0.020)	0.102*** (0.200)	0.223*** (0.019)	0.158*** (0.020)	0.101*** (0.199)	0.222*** (0.019)	0.156*** (0.019)
Leading Position =Yes	-0.024 (0.023)	-0.025 (0.021)	-0.054*** (0.021)	-0.024 (0.023)	-0.021 (0.021)	-0.071*** (0.021)	-0.030 (0.023)	0.014 (0.021)	-0.078*** (0.021)
Union Membership =Yes	-0.039 (0.024)	0.002 (0.023)	0.010 (0.024)	-0.042** (0.024)	-0.001 (0.023)	0.010 (0.022)	-0.041* (0.024)	0.010 (0.022)	0.007 (0.024)
Ever Unemployed =Yes	-0.050*** (0.022)	-0.037* (0.021)	-0.025 (0.021)	-0.049* (0.022)	-0.036* (0.021)	-0.020 (0.021)	-0.050** (0.022)	-0.037* (0.021)	-0.021 (0.021)
County	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
Pseudo R-Squared	0.195	0.082	0.082	0.195	0.082	0.066	0.194	0.079	0.063

Source: ESS 2012, own calculation, probit estimation with marginal effects, with design weights, levels of significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, N=3,509.

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