



# LÜNEBURG WORKSHOP IN ECONOMICS WORKSHOP ON MICROECONOMICS

23./24.FEBRUAR 2017



## PROGRAMMÜBERSICHT

### 22. Februar 2017

ab 19 Uhr      Get Together

### 23. Februar 2017

09:00      Eröffnung und Begrüßung  
09:15-12:45      Vorträge  
12:45-13:45      Mittagspause  
13:45-17:00      Vorträge  
17:15-18:30      Keynote Lecture  
20:00      Conference Dinner

### 24. Februar 2017

09:30-12:45      Vorträge  
12:45-13:45      Mittagspause  
13:45-17:00      Vorträge  
19:00      optionales Abendprogramm

Alle Vorträge und Pausen finden in Raum C4.215 statt (Gebäude 4, Campus Scharnhorststraße, 2. Stock).



# PROGRAMM

## ORGANISATOREN

Boris Hirsch  
Mario Mechtel  
Christian Pfeifer

### Mittwoch, 22. Februar 2017

ab 19:00 Get Together (Capitol)

### Donnerstag, 23. Februar 2017

09:00 Eröffnung und Begrüßung  
09:15-11:15 Session 1: Experimental Economics  
11:15-11:45 Kaffeepause  
11:45-12:45 Session 2: (No) Competition  
12:45-13:45 Mittagspause  
13:45-15:15 Session 3: (Endogenous) Preferences  
15:15-15:30 Kaffeepause  
15:30-17:00 Session 4: Mainzonomics  
17:00-17:15 Kaffeepause  
17:15-18:30 Keynote Lecture Karlhans Sauernheimer: VWL auf Sinnsuche  
20:00 Conference Dinner (Frappé)

### Freitag, 24. Februar 2017

09:30-11:00 Session 5: Political Economy  
11:00-11:15 Kaffeepause  
11:15-12:45 Session 6: Groups/Teams  
12:45-13:45 Mittagspause  
13:45-15:15 Session 7: Education  
15:15-15:30 Kaffeepause  
15:30-17:00 Session 8: Labour  
ab 19:00 optionales Abendprogramm



# TEILNEHMERLISTE

- Daniel Arnold (ZEW Mannheim)
- Agnes Bäker (Universität Zürich)
- Bernd Bartels (Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz)
- Florian Baumann (Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn)
- Eva Berger (Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz)
- Christian Bruns (Georg-August Universität Göttingen)
- Adrian Chadi (IAAEU, Universität Trier)
- Philipp Denter (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)
- Gerald Eisenkopf (Universität Vechta)
- Tim Friehe (Philipps-Universität Marburg)
- Leonie Gerhards (Universität Hamburg)
- Florian Hett (Goethe-Universität Frankfurt)
- Boris Hirsch (Leuphana Universität Lüneburg)
- Jan Marcus (Universität Hamburg)
- Mario Mechtel (Leuphana Universität Lüneburg)
- Ole Monscheuer (Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg)
- Henning Müller (Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz)
- Michael Oberfichtner (Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg)
- Fabian Paetzel (Helmut-Schmidt-Universität Hamburg)
- Hannah Paule-Paludkiewicz (Goethe-Universität Frankfurt)
- Christian Pfeifer (Leuphana Universität Lüneburg)
- Karlhans Sauernheimer (Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz)
- Patrick Schneider (Goethe-Universität Frankfurt)
- Daniel Schnitzlein (Leibniz Universität Hannover)
- Jakob Schwab (Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik Bonn)
- Katja Seidel (Leuphana Universität Lüneburg)
- Elena Shvartsman (Universität Basel)
- Dana Sisak (Erasmus University Rotterdam)

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## KONTAKT

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# DONNERSTAG, 23.02.

## ORGANISATOREN

Boris Hirsch  
Mario Mechtel  
Christian Pfeifer

**09:00**

### **Eröffnung und Begrüßung**

Raum C4.215 (Gebäude 4, Campus Scharnhorststraße, 2. Stock)

**09:15-11:15**

### **Session 1: Experimental Economics, Chair: Gerald Eisenkopf**

Florian Hett: “Choosing Who You Are: The Structure and Behavioral Effects of Revealed Identification Preferences”

Mario Mechtel: “Forced to Be Generous – Experimental Evidence on the Behavioral Effects of Minimum Wages outside the Laboratory”

Henning Müller: “An Experimental Beauty-Contest Game with Children in School Age”

Gerald Eisenkopf: “Trust in Third Parties”

**11:45-12:45**

### **Session 2: (No) Competition, Chair: Dana Sisak**

Florian Baumann: “Product design and ex-post remedy incentives with software-based products”

Dana Sisak: “Showing off or laying low?”

**13:45-15:15**

### **Session 3: (Endogenous) Preferences, Chair: Tim Friehe**

Hannah Paule-Paludkiewicz: “Cultural Determinants of Household Saving Behavior”

Ole Monscheuer: “Citizenship and the Social Assimilation of Immigrants”



Tim Friehe: “Media content's role in the making of a democrat: Evidence from East Germany”

**15:30-17:00**

**Session 4: Mainzonomics, Chair: Eva Berger**

Bernd Bartels: “No Smoking Gun: Private Shareholders, Governance Rules and Central Bank Financial Behavior”

Jakob Schwab: “Reaping the Gains: Specialization and Capital Flows”

Eva Berger: “Real Estate Agent Commissions and Housing Rental Prices – Evidence from a Natural Experiment”

**17:15-18:30**

**Keynote Lecture: VWL auf Sinnsuche**

Karlhans Sauernheimer

**20:00**

**Conference Dinner (Frappé, Schröderstraße 14)**

# FREITAG, 24.02.

**09:30-11:00**

**Session 5: Political Economy, Chair: Leonie Gerhards**

Philipp Denter: “Informative campaigning and policy choice”

Christian Bruns: “Accountability and Polarized Electorates – A Neutrality Result”

Leonie Gerhards: “The impact of deliberative structures on voting behavior”

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**ORGANISATOREN**

Boris Hirsch  
Mario Mechtel  
Christian Pfeifer

**11:15-12:45**

**Session 6: Groups/Teams, Chair: Adrian Chadi**

Fabian Paetzel: “Entitlements and Loyalty in Groups: An Experimental Study”

Agnes Bäker: “Personality, Team Building, and Team Performance”

Adrian Chadi: “Lies at Work – On the Implications of Cheating for Team Outcomes”

**13:45-15:15**

**Session 7: Education, Chair: Michael Oberfichtner**

Jan Marcus: “The effect of increasing education efficiency on university enrollment: Evidence from administrative data and an unusual schooling reform in Germany”

Daniel Schnitzlein: “The protective (?) effect of education on mental health”

Michael Oberfichtner: “Does early child care attendance influence children's cognitive and non-cognitive skill development?”

**15:30-17:00**

**Session 8: Labour, Chair: Patrick Schneider**

Daniel Arnold: “Job security and sickness presenteeism”

Elena Shvartsman: “The labour market success of Swiss university graduates and the state of the economy at graduation”

Patrick Schneider: “Peer Effects in Labor Supply”



# BOOK OF ABSTRACTS

*Florian Hett, Markus Kröll, Mario Mechtel*

## **Choosing Who You Are: The Structure and Behavioral Effects of Revealed Identification Preferences**

Social identity is an important driver of behavior. But where do differences in social identity come from? We use a novel laboratory experiment based on a revealed preference approach to analyze how individuals choose their identity. Facing a trade-off between monetary payments and belonging to different groups, individuals are willing to forego significant earnings to avoid certain groups and thereby reveal their identification preferences. We then show that these identification preferences are systematically related to behavioral heterogeneity in group-specific social preferences. These results illustrate the importance of identification as a choice and its relevance for explaining individual behavior.

*Adrian Chadi, Mario Mechtel, Vanessa Mertins*


## **Forced to Be Generous – Experimental Evidence on the Behavioral Effects of Minimum Wages outside the Laboratory**

This paper analyzes the behavioral effects of minimum wages at the firm level. We investigate how enforced pay increases due to the introduction of the statutory minimum wage in Germany influence employees' work motivation and reservation wages. Given the same income for each individual in a workforce of more than a hundred telephone interviewers, we manipulate the information on why a project leadership decided to increase hourly pay for a follow-up task. Our results conflict with the idea of reduced gift-exchange and negative implications for firms once employees learn that a relatively high wage level was not implemented voluntarily. Instead, our data suggest that an exogenous intervention into a firm's wage policy might lead to a solidarity effect and thereby foster reciprocal behavior towards the employer.

*Henning Müller*

## **An Experimental Beauty-Contest Game with Children in School Age**

I developed an experimental beauty-contest game for children in school age and tested the design of the game in a study in schools with 114 children aged 9-11 years. Results demonstrate that children can successfully learn and play a beauty-contest game. First-round choices, depth of reasoning, and learning over time are largely comparable to studies run with adults.



In general, neither gender nor age are related to choices in the game. However, there is a robust positive effect of age on first round choices. Overall, this study demonstrates that the beauty-contest game can be used for analyzing developmental processes and that children in this age group are capable of strategic interaction.

*Gerald Eisenkopf, Stephan Nüesch*

### **Trust in Third Parties**

Independent decision makers are appointed to promote trust in firms by shielding investors from rent appropriation efforts of business insiders. We conduct experiments to show how appointment procedures for such third parties shape the trust of investors and the actual distributions of returns on investment. We find that investments increase only after preceding positive returns on investment even when the third party is truly independent. A simple one-sided reputation mechanism eliminates the benefits of a supposedly independent third party. Surprisingly, insiders are not considered less trustworthy when they refuse the involvement of a truly independent third party.

*Florian Baumann, Tim Friehe*

### **Product design and ex-post remedy incentives with software-based products**

Many modern products are software-based which allows firms to alter product characteristics via remote software updates. This paper analyzes the incentives of a monopolist to use remote software updates as an ex-post remedy in combination with ex-ante prevention measures to address expected harm that consumers may suffer from defective products. We find that private incentives for the use of an update generally diverge from socially optimal ones, and that the divergence can be mitigated by shifting (some) harm to the firm, that is, by imposing product liability.

Philipp Denter, John Morgan, *Dana Sisak*

### **Showing off or laying low?**

We study a situation where a newbie with potentially unknown talent enters into competition with an established competitor of known talent. Assuming the newbie is aware of his talent, we first study his incentive to show off and reveal his type through costly signaling to his competitor. We find that whether he reveals his type in equilibrium, depends on his as well as the incumbent's talent. When the incumbent is relatively weak, strong newbie types show off in equilibrium. Otherwise, showing off does not occur. We then study whether the incumbent is hurt by the newbie's showing off behavior. Interestingly, we find that both competitors benefit from showing off if it happens, to the detriment of the principal.





Thus, a principal interested in maximizing aggregate effort prefers a firm culture where showing off is not possible. We also show that this result may be reversed when the newbie exhibits overconfidence.

Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln, Paolo Masella, *Hannah Paule-Paludkiewicz*

### **Cultural Determinants of Household Saving Behavior**

Relying on the epidemiological approach and using data on second-generation immigrants from both Germany and the UK, we show that culture is a significant driver of household saving behavior. Second generation immigrants from countries that put strong emphasis on thrift or wealth accumulation tend to save more in Germany. By linking parents to their children, we show that these two cultural components affect the saving behavior of both first generation immigrants and their children, and also provide suggestive evidence that future-orientation is related to saving behavior through the intergenerational transmission of language.

Christina Gathmann, Nicolas Keller, *Ole Monscheuer*

### **Citizenship and the Social Assimilation of Immigrants**

We investigate whether faster access to citizenship improves the social assimilation of immigrants in the destination country. The empirical analysis relies on two immigration reforms, which allowed certain arrival and birth cohorts to naturalize after only 8 years of residency, while others had to wait up to 15 years instead. Our results suggest that shorter residency requirements have significant effects on fertility choices, family formation and the choice of partners. The option to naturalize faster delays marriage but has no effect on divorce or cohabitation rates. Female immigrants have lower fertility and postpone their first birth to later ages. The average effects mask substantial heterogeneity across immigrant groups. In particular, immigrants from more traditional cultures have not only higher fertility and marriage rates, but also adapt their behavior more slowly than the average immigrant.

*Tim Friehe*, Helge Müller, Florian Neumeier

### **Media content's role in the making of a democrat: Evidence from East Germany**

This paper explores the causal influence of access to Western television programming on voting behavior. We exploit a natural experiment involving access to West German TV within the German Democratic Republic in which only geography and topography determined the allocation of individuals to treatment and control groups. Focusing on both the shares of extremist parties and voter turnout, we find that in the post-reunification decade in which TV content was harmonized,



regions that already had access to Western TV broadcasts before reunification experience lower vote shares of extremist parties and higher voter turnout.

*Bernd Bartels, Barry Eichengreen, Beatrice Weder di Mauro*

**No Smoking Gun: Private Shareholders, Governance Rules and Central Bank Financial Behavior**

Do central banks with private shareholders differ in their financial behavior from purely public central banks? Private shareholders might bias central banks toward focusing excessively on profits, dividends and risks to their balance sheets, but their influence may also be mitigated by governance rules. We study 35 OECD central banks, including eight with private shareholders, using new data on governance rules. We find that central banks with private shareholders do not differ from their purely public counterparts in their profitability, nor are they more financially cautious in the sense of building more loss-absorbing capacity. We find that broader governance rules matter for financial payouts.

*Christina Ortseifer, Jakob Schwab*

**Reaping the Gains: Specialization and Capital Flows**

This paper gives a new answer to the old question of whether international trade and capital flows are substitutes or complements. In contrast to conventional intuition, we show that Heckscher-Ohlin trade that takes place in high-skill and low-skill intensive goods creates incentives for capital flows into countries that partly specialize along their abundant skill factor. Technically, we incorporate capital as a composite factor in a tractable 3-factor neoclassical trade model. It shows that countries for whom trade induces greater trade specialization should observe larger capital inflows. By using data on revealed comparative advantage while controlling for common factors, we provide empirical evidence for this result.

*Eva Berger, Felix Schmidt*

**Real Estate Agent Commissions and Housing Rental Prices – Evidence from a Natural Experiment**

The aim of this paper is to investigate whether renters and landlords in the rental housing prices act rationally or are prone to behavioral biases. In Germany, in June 2015 a new law has been introduced determining that landlords ordering real estate agents are no longer allowed to make renters pay the commission (which was common practice earlier). We examine whether this law made rental prices increase—as supposed by standard economic theory—or whether rental prices did not increase—as supposed by behavioral theory. We reject the hypothesis of the law making rents increase as predicted by the standard model; in contrast, we cannot reject the hypothesis of the law having zero effect on rental prices.



*Philipp Denter*

### **Informative campaigning and policy choice**

Two candidates for political office have to decide whether to choose a moderate or partisan platform, and then whether to start a positive or negative campaign, i.e. whether to campaign on the own platform or on the platform of the political opponent. Campaigning is informative but noisy. In equilibrium, negative campaigning can prevent politicians from choosing partisan policies, and thus may increase welfare. However, and counter intuitive, there also exist equilibria in which negative campaigning facilitates partisan policies in equilibrium. The results are then used to discuss the implications for campaign finance reform.

*Christian Bruns, Robert Schwager*


### **Accountability and Polarized Electorates – A Neutrality Result**

It is often feared that ideological leanings of an electorate can reduce an incumbent's accountability. We show, however, that such ideological leanings do not reduce accountability when voters have the realistic option to abstain. In our model, a challenger and an incumbent choose an ideology position and the incumbent also provides a public good. Citizens observe the ideology positions and the incumbent's performance and then decide to vote for one candidate or to abstain. Our main result is that the incumbent can be held accountable even if the decisive votes are cast by citizens with clear ideological leanings towards one of the candidates.

*Jordi Brandts, Leonie Gerhards, Lydia Mechtenberg*

### **The impact of deliberative structures on voting behavior**

In an experimental study, we investigate which deliberative structures (best) promote the truthful exchange of information, despite incentives to lie. Societies consist of six players – 3 “whites” and 3 “blues”. The whites receive an imprecise signal about the state of the world and can share these as well as voting recommendations with the rest of their society in a freeform chat before the six players finally cast their vote in a secret ballot. Across treatments, we exogenously vary the communication protocol: no communication vs. only the whites may publicly chat vs. whites and blues may publicly chat. We find that the society as a whole benefits from communication opportunities. Remarkably, however, mainly the whites’ earnings increase compared to those from the treatment without a chat. The blues are significantly more reluctant to follow the whites’ lead if they can only listen, but not reply, to what the whites announce. From this we conclude that the group of blues trusts and supports the whites to a greater extent in a situation (treatment) in which they at least have a say.



*Fabian Paetzel, Rupert Sausgruber*

**Entitlements and Loyalty in Groups: An Experimental Study**

We study loyalty in groups that are exogenously assigned based on members' performances in a task. We observe that in-group bias is strong and significant among subjects who score high in performance, and that it is weak and insignificant among those who score low. This asymmetric pattern is mirrored in the punishment of disloyal subjects within groups. The results are consistent with an explanation according to which fairness judgments depend on entitlement considerations and provide a new perspective on theory and empirical research that argues that group identity increases with the status of the group.

*Agnes Bäker, Alexandra Zaby*

**Personality, Team Building, and Team Performance**

This paper addresses the role of team members' personality traits, particularly with respect to how these traits affect the development of the team in mandatory team building phases. We use data from a real-effort classroom experiment in which we randomly assigned participants to 3-person groups. Regression results reveal that team building phases allow for personality traits to influence team performance, whereas in newly formed teams which have not yet engaged in team building, personality plays no role for team performance.

*Adrian Chadi, Konstantin Homolka*

**Lies at Work – On the Implications of Cheating for Team Outcomes**

This experimental study analyses the consequences of cheating at the workplace by examining how co-workers are affected when their team members cheat. To this aim, we establish a workplace scenario in which three individuals have to do a real-effort task in order to receive pay based on team performance. Between two work rounds, it is possible for two of them to obtain a bonus through a die game, which either allows for cheating or not. By studying worker behavior when cheating takes place, compared to when it is not, we identify the effects of deception on team outcomes, without using deception as experimenters.



*Jan Marcus, Vaishali Zambre*

**The effect of increasing education efficiency on university enrollment: Evidence from administrative data and an unusual schooling reform in Germany**

We examine the consequences of compressing secondary schooling on students' university enrollment. An unusual education reform in Germany reduced the length of academic high school while simultaneously increasing the instruction hours in the remaining years. Accordingly, students receive the same amount of schooling but over a shorter period of time, constituting an efficiency gain from an individual's perspective. Based on a difference-in-differences approach using administrative data on all students in Germany, we find that this reform decreased enrollment rates. Moreover, students are more likely to delay their enrollment, to drop out of university, and to change their major.

*Sarah C. Dahmann, Daniel D. Schnitzlein*

**The protective (?) effect of education on mental health**

This paper analyzes whether education has a protective effect on mental health. To estimate causal effects, we employ an instrumental-variable (IV) technique with two different instruments to estimate local average treatment effects at different parts of the educational distribution: (i) a reform extending compulsory schooling by one year implemented between 1949 and 1969 in West German federal states, and (ii) the individual availability of higher education measured by the spatial distance to the nearest university at age 19. We use rich individual data on adults aged 50 to 85 from the German Socio-Economic Panel study, augmented by detailed information on universities from the German Rectors' Conference. We complement analyses on the Mental Component Summary score as a generic measure of overall mental health by disorder-specific diagnoses. Results support existing evidence on a positive relationship between completed years of secondary schooling and mental health in standard OLS estimations. In contrast however, the IV estimations reveal no such causal protective effect. If any, the estimates point toward a negative effect among the lower-educated. These results are confirmed when explicitly modeling effect heterogeneity through marginal treatment effects.



Daniel Kuehnle, *Michael Oberfichtner*

**Does early child care attendance influence children's cognitive and non-cognitive skill development?**

We analyse the short- and medium-run effects of starting child care earlier in Germany on children's skills using a fuzzy discontinuity in child care starting age between December and January. Combining survey and administrative data, we follow one cohort from age five to 15 and examine standardised cognitive test scores, non-cognitive skill measures, and school track choice. We find no evidence that starting child care earlier affects children's outcomes. Due to our large samples, we can rule out substantial effects. Our results imply that three-year old children who would attend child care anyway are unlikely to substantially benefit from starting child care five months earlier.

*Daniel Arnold*

**Job security and sickness presenteeism**

Job security increases the duration of sickness absence which has often been interpreted as shirking. But new evidence shows that some employees go to work when they are sick (sickness presenteeism). Hence, an increase of absence due to employment protection does not necessarily mean that the employees shirk. Instead sick employees might come to work if the job is insecure, while they stay at home in a secure job. We investigate empirically how job security affects sickness presenteeism behavior. Using European data we find that employees in unsecure jobs come more often to work while sick (extensive and intensive margin).

*Elena Shvartsman*

**The labour market success of Swiss university graduates and the state of the economy at graduation**

This paper analyses whether the short- and mid-term labour market outcomes of graduates from Swiss universities are affected by the state of the domestic economy at the time of labour market entry. This analysis contributes to the question as to whether an individual's labour market outcome is determined inter alia by luck. The study provides empirical evidence demonstrating that unfavourable economic conditions at the time of labour market entry have a strong negative impact on the individuals' wages, but not on their labour market status. These results remain largely robust, when the main explanatory variable, the regional unemployment rate in the actual year of an individual's graduation, is instrumented with the regional unemployment rate in the expected year of the individual's graduation. Furthermore, various supplementary regressions provide possible explanations for the underlying channels of the observed effects. For instance, there is a strong



statistical association between the regional unemployment rate at the time of an individual's graduation and the duration of his job search and also the quality of his job-qualifications match.

*Patrick Schneider*

### **Peer Effects in Labor Supply**

This paper examines the effect of peers on adolescent labor supply. Using Add Health data on secondary schools in the U.S., we investigate whether these effects are driven by social norm compliance, leisure complementarity or a “Keeping up with the Joneses” story. We use a social interaction model that is estimated by a quasi maximum likelihood approach. The data allows us to control for common shocks at the network level, unobserved individual differences as well as solving the reflection problem and addressing endogenous network formation. We find positive but small peer effects, where the estimated social multiplier is at least 1.07. Further we find evidence that is consistent with leisure complementarities but not with a “Keeping up with the Joneses” story.

*Keynote Speaker*

### **Karlhans Sauernheimer**

Karlhans Sauernheimer war bis zu seiner Emeritierung im Jahr 2010 Inhaber des Lehrstuhls für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insb. Volkswirtschaftstheorie und Direktor des Instituts für Allgemeine und Außenwirtschaftstheorie an der Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz. In dieser Rolle war er für zahlreiche der regelmäßigen Teilnehmer dieses Workshops eine prägende Persönlichkeit während des Studiums beziehungsweise der Promotion.

Karlhans Sauernheimer absolvierte nach seinem Abitur eine Ausbildung zum Bankkaufmann, an die sich das Studium der Volkswirtschaftslehre in Mainz anschloss. Es folgten Promotion (1974) und Habilitation (1980). Nach Vertretungsprofessuren in Mannheim und Osnabrück übernahm er Professuren für VWL an der Universität GHS Essen (1983-1990), der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (1991-1995) und der Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz (1995-2010).

Er war Vorsitzender des Ausschusses für Außenwirtschaftstheorie und –politik im Verein für Socialpolitik, stellvertretender Vorsitzender des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats des ifo-Instituts München, Leiter der VWL-Ausbildung des Auswärtigen Amtes sowie Mitherausgeber und geschäftsführender Herausgeber des „Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftswissenschaften“. Zahlreiche Publikationen auf dem Gebiet der Außenwirtschaftstheorie sowie der Internationalen Handels- und Währungspolitik.




# ANFAHRT ZUM CAMPUS

## Mit der Bahn/dem Bus:

Lüneburg liegt an der Hauptverbindungsstrecke Hannover – Hamburg. Von Hannover benötigt ein ICE etwa eine Stunde, von Hamburg aus fährt ein IC oder ein ME (Metronom, regionaler Schnellzug) in 30 Minuten nach Lüneburg. Lüneburg gehört zum Einzugsbereich des Hamburger Verkehrsverbundes (HVV).

Es fahren im 10 Minuten-Takt die Buslinien 5011 (Richtung Rettmer/Häcklingen) und 5012 (Richtung Bockelsberg) zum Campus. Aussteigen müssen Sie dann an der Haltestelle Scharnhorststraße/DJH.

Eine schnelle Alternative bietet das Taxi. Eine Fahrt vom Bahnhof zum Campus Scharnhorststraße kostet in etwa 7 bis 10 Euro.








# SCHARNHORSTSTRAÙE

## Mit dem Pkw

Von Süden Folgen Sie der A7 Hannover-Hamburg bis zur Abfahrt Soltau-Ost und anschließend der Bundesstraße 209 bis Lüneburg. Ab hier ist die Anfahrt zum Universitätscampus ausgeschildert.

Von Norden Sie folgen der A39 Hamburg-Lüneburg und weiter der Ostumgehung bis zur Abfahrt Lüneburg-Häcklingen. Ab hier ist die Anfahrt zum Universitätscampus ausgeschildert.

Parken Bitte beachten Sie die Parkvorschriften auf dem Campusgelände und stellen Sie Ihr Auto auf einem der ausgewiesenen Parkplätze ab. Falschparker müssen damit rechnen, dass ihr Fahrzeug abgeschleppt wird.





# CONFERENCE DINNER

Das Conference Dinner findet am Donnerstagabend im Restaurant „Frappé“ statt.

Das „Frappé“ befindet sich in der Altstadt (Schröderstraße 14) und ist nur wenige Gehminuten vom zentralen Platz „Am Sande“ entfernt. Fußläufig vom Hotel „Zum Roten Tore“ ist es in ca. zehn Minuten erreichbar. Ab dem „Kunsthôtel Residenz“ bzw. dem Campus Scharnhorststraße empfiehlt sich die Anfahrt mit dem Bus (Linien 5011 bzw. 5012).

Vom „Sande“ aus geht man an der Industrie- und Handelskammer vorbei durch die Grapengießerstraße und biegt an der ersten Möglichkeit rechts in die Kuhstraße ab. Am Schrankenplatz geht man weiter in die Schröderstraße, das „Frappé“ befindet sich auf der rechten Seite.

# GET TOGETHER

Das Get Together am Mittwochabend eröffnet den Workshop inoffiziell. Es findet ab 19 Uhr im „Capitol“ (Reichenbachstraße 1) statt.


Vom Platz „Am Sande“ ist das „Capitol“ fußläufig in wenigen Minuten erreichbar. Man läuft an der Einhorn-Apotheke vorbei in die Kleine Bäckerstraße, dann durch die Große Bäckerstraße weiter bis zum Marktplatz. Dort geht es geradeaus weiter an der Buchhandlung „Lünebuch“ vorbei in die Bardowicker Straße. Das „Capitol“ befindet sich auf der rechten Straßenseite kurz vor der Kreuzung Bardowicker Straße/Reichenbachstraße.



# SEHENSWERTES IN LÜNEBURG

Das Lüneburger **Rathaus** liegt am Marktplatz und gilt als eines der schönsten mittelalterlichen Rathäuser Deutschlands (Baubeginn im 13. Jahrhundert). Vom Rathaus aus gelangt man auf eine der Café- und Kneipenmeilen Lüneburgs (über die Straße „Auf der Münze“ in die Schröderstraße und von dort in die Kuhstraße). Dort schließen sich die Grapengießerstraße sowie die Heiligengeiststraße an, die zum Einkaufen und Verweilen in weiteren Cafés und Restaurants einladen. Der Platz „**Am Sande**“ ist der älteste Platz Lüneburgs und bildet das Zentrum der Altstadt. Ins Auge stechen die schönen Backsteinhäuser mit ihren charakteristischen Giebeln. Am Ende des Sande befinden sich die **St. Johannis-Kirche** sowie der **Wasserturm**. Über die Straße „Am Berge“ gelangt man ins Wasserviertel, der **Stintmarkt** gehört zu den wohl bekanntesten Foto-Ansichten Lüneburgs.

Über diesen kleinen Stadtrundgang hinaus ist die Straße „**Auf dem Meere**“ sehr zu empfehlen, die im Senkungsgebiet liegt und damit an Lüneburgs Geschichte als Stadt des Salzes erinnert. Vom Rathaus aus ist sie in fünf Minuten fußläufig zu erreichen. An sie schließt sich die **St. Michaelis-Kirche** an, von der aus man entweder den **Kalkberg** (der eine prächtige Aussicht über ganz Lüneburg und Umgebung bietet, aus der Stadt aber nicht zu sehen ist) besteigen oder über die Straße „Auf der Altstadt“ zurück in den Altstadtkern laufen kann.



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