Vorlesungsverzeichnis

Suchen Sie hier über ein Suchformular im Vorlesungsverzeichnis der Leuphana.


Lehrveranstaltungen

Behavioral Economics (Vorlesung)

Dozent/in: Mario Mechtel

Termin:
wöchentlich | Mittwoch | 12:15 - 13:45 | 21.10.2019 - 31.01.2020 | C 14.001 Seminarraum
Einzeltermin | Mo, 21.10.2019, 14:15 - Mo, 21.10.2019, 15:45 | C 7.307 Seminarraum | Ersatztermin für 16.10.

Inhalt: Based on numerous empirical and experimental insights, the field of behavioral economics emerged within the last decades and became an important part of mainstream economic research. The course will cover fundamental topics from this field. We will analyze the effects of reference points for behavior, how individuals make intertemporal choices, the role of social preferences (e.g., altruism, fairness, envy) for decision-making, and how social groups individuals identify with affect behavior. Additionally, we will cover well-known heuristics and biases (e.g., confirmation bias, overconfidence). We will also analyze strategic interaction using behavioral game theory. At the end, we will cover selected applications (e.g., labor market, happiness research, nudging). Behavioral economics embeds insights from disciplines such as psychology and sociology, but aims at building formal models of economic behavior to generate testable predictions. In this course, we will stick to basic principles of neoclassical reasoning and modeling, but we will depart in some dimensions and analyze situations in which individuals have limited willpower, rationality, and self-interest (in some sense). We will, subsequently, compare behavioral approaches and results with those from standard neoclassical economics. Contents 1. Introduction 2. Prospect Theory 3. Intertemporal Choices 4. Social Preferences 5. Social Identity 6. Behavioral Game Theory 7. Heuristics and Biases 8. Selected Applications

Behavioral Economics (Übung)

Dozent/in: Mario Mechtel

Termin:
Einzeltermin | Mi, 23.10.2019, 14:15 - Mi, 23.10.2019, 15:45 | C 14.001 Seminarraum | Ersatztermin für 21.10.
14-täglich | Montag | 14:15 - 15:45 | 04.11.2019 - 31.01.2020 | C 12.001 Seminarraum

Inhalt: See lecture "Behavioral Economics".

Personalökonomik (Vorlesung/Übung)

Dozent/in: Christian Pfeifer

Termin:
wöchentlich | Mittwoch | 11:00 - 13:45 | 14.10.2019 - 31.01.2020 | C 16.129 Seminarraum | Die Vorlesung mit integrierter Übung findet wöchentlich mit 3 SWS statt.

Inhalt: Die Veranstaltung richtet sich ausschließlich an Minor VWL Studierende. Personnel Economics is a subdiscipline of Labor Economics and Business Economics, in which microeconomic and econometric tools are used to analyze interactions of firms and employees. The field of personnel economics has evolved over the past three decades and has received increasing attention at American Business Schools and also in economic research. The lecture is accompanied by an integrated exercise. Part 0: Introduction Part 1: External vs. Internal Labor Markets 1.1. External labor markets 1.1.1. Labor supply model 1.1.2. Labor demand model 1.1.3. Equilibrium market wage and employment 1.1.4. Compensating wage differentials 1.2. Internal labor markets and long-term employment relationships 1.2.1. Insurance model 1.2.2. Transaction costs 1.2.3. Human capital theory 1.3. Q&A, Exercises, Discussion Part 2: Managing Turnover 2.1. Recruitment of employees 2.1.1. Selection 2.1.2. Raiding 2.2. Exits of employees 2.2.1. Quits 2.2.2. Layoffs 2.3. Labor flexibility 2.3.1. Dynamic labor demand and adjustment costs 2.3.2. Temporary workforce 2.3.3. Working time flexibility 2.4. Efficient allocation of employees (Internal labor turnover) 2.5. Q&A, Exercises, Discussion Part 3: Managing Motivation and Remuneration 3.1. Agency theory and the need for incentives 3.1.1. Different objective functions and information asymmetries 3.1.2. Forms of principal-agency relationships 3.2. Time rates and efficiency wage theories 3.2.1. Input based remuneration 3.2.2. Labor as efficiency units 3.2.3. Non-shirking efficiency wage model 3.2.4. Turnover cost efficiency wage model 3.2.5. Adverse selection efficiency wage model 3.2.6. Fairness efficiency wage model 3.3. Piece rates and performance pay 3.3.1. Output based remuneration 3.3.2. Worker’s choice of work effort under piece rates 3.3.3. Problems in performance pay schemes 3.3.4. Design and effects of MBO bonus payments 3.4. Promotions and tournament theory 3.4.1. Wage hierarchies and promotion tournaments 3.4.2. Worker’s choice of work effort in tournaments 3.4.3. Problems in promotion tournaments 3.5. Seniority and deferred compensation schemes 3.5.1. Upward sloping wage-tenure profiles 3.5.2. Deferred compensation model 3.5.3. Problems and applications 3.6. Intrinsic motivation (extrinsic vs. intrinsic motivation, crowding out effects) 3.7. Q&A, Exercises, Discussion Part 4: Managing Worker Codetermination 4.1. Works councils and codetermination 4.1.1. Communication between workers and management 4.1.2. Optimal level of codetermination 4.1.3. Empirical effects of works councils 4.2. Unions and collective contracts 4.2.1. Union organization and importance across countries 4.2.2. Monopoly union wage setting and employment 4.2.3. Efficient wage bargaining and employment 4.3. Q&A, Exercises, Discussion Borjas, G.J. (2010), Labor Economics, 5th edition, McGraw-Hill [B:Chapter]. Lazear, E.P., Gibbs, M. (2009), Personnel Economics in Practice, 2nd edition, Wiley & Sons [LG:Chapter].