Vorlesungsverzeichnis

Personalökonomik (Vorlesung/Übung)

Inhalt: Die Personalökonomik als Teildisziplin der Arbeitsökonomik hat in den letzten zwei Jahrzehnten sowohl in der Lehre (insbesondere an amerikanischen Business Schools) als auch in der Forschung enorm an Bedeutung gewonnen. Im Zentrum der Personalökonomik stehen mikroökonomische und mikroökonometrische Analysen der Interaktionen von Firmen und ihrer Mitarbeiter. Die Veranstaltung besteht aus einem Vorlesungsteil, in dem arbeits- und personalökonomische Theorien vorgestellt und anhand von Beispielen in der Gruppe diskutiert werden, und einer Übung, in der die Studenten an die Forschung herangeführt werden sollen und empirische Zeitschriftenartikel besprochen werden. Der Vorlesungsteil der Veranstaltung orientiert sich an den Lehrbüchern von Borjas (Borjas, G.J. (2010), Labor Economics, 5th edition, McGraw-Hill [B:Chapter]) sowie Lazear/Gibbs (Lazear, E.P., Gibbs, M. (2009), Personnel Economics in Practice, 2nd edition, Wiley & Sons [LG:Chapter]) und gliedert sich wie folgt: Part 0: Introduction [LG: Preface] 0.1. General course information 0.2. Literature 0.3. What is personnel economics? 0.4. Course outline Part 1: External vs. Internal Labor Markets [B: 2.2-2.7, 3.1-3.4, 3.9, 4.1-4.2, 6.10-6.12; LG: 3] 1.1. External labor markets 1.1.1. Labor supply model: utility maximizing worker behavior 1.1.2. Labor demand model: profit maximizing firm behavior 1.1.3. Equilibrium market wage and employment 1.2. Internal labor markets and long-term employment relationships 1.2.1. Insurance model: tradeoff between wages and employment security 1.2.2. Transaction costs: benefits from long-term contracts 1.2.3. Human capital theory: schooling, general vs. specific on-the-job training 1.3. Discussion: Pros and cons of internal labor markets. Part 2: Managing Turnover [B: 8.9-8.12; LG: 1, 2, 4] 2.1. Recruitment of employees 2.1.1. Selection: signaling and self-selection, screening and probation periods 2.1.2. Raiding: bidding for employees of competitors 2.2. Exits of employees 2.2.1. Quits: costs of employees’ voluntary departures 2.2.2. Layoffs: downsizing under constraints (employment protection, fairness) 2.3. Labor flexibility 2.3.1. Dynamic labor demand and adjustment costs 2.3.2. Temporary workforce: dual internal labor markets 2.3.3. Working time flexibility 2.4. Efficient allocation of employees 2.4.1. Internal labor turnover: task hierarchies, ports of entries, and promotions 2.5. Discussion: Pros and cons of turnover. 2.6. Discussion: Why do some firms experience higher turnover than other firms? Part 3: Managing Motivation and Remuneration [B: 11; LG: 9, 10, 11, 12] 3.1. Agency theory and the need for incentives 3.1.1. Different objective functions and information asymmetries 3.1.2. Forms of principal-agency relationships 3.2. Time rates and efficiency wage theories 3.2.1. Input based remuneration: wages paid for time being at workplace 3.2.2. Labor as efficiency units: living standard and effort function 3.2.3. Non-shirking model: incentives not to get fired 3.2.4. Turnover cost model: less quits 3.2.5. Adverse selection model: more productive applicants 3.2.6. Fairness model: gift exchange and reciprocity 3.3. Piece rates and performance pay 3.3.1. Output based remuneration: production output, sales, profits 3.3.2. Worker’s choice of work effort under piece rates 3.3.3. Problems in performance pay schemes 3.4. Promotions and tournament theory 3.4.1. Wage hierarchies and promotion tournaments 3.4.2. Worker’s choice of work effort in tournaments 3.4.3. Problems in promotion tournaments 3.5. Seniority and deferred compensation schemes 3.5.1. Upward sloping wage-tenure profiles 3.5.2. Deferred compensation model: incentives not to get fired 3.5.3. Problems and applications 3.6. Intrinsic motivation 3.6.1. Extrinsic vs. intrinsic motivation and crowding out effects 3.7. Discussion: Pros and cons of different incentive schemes. 3.8. Discussion: How to design remuneration for top managers? Part 4: Managing Worker Codetermination [B: 10; LG: 15] 4.1. Works councils and codetermination 4.1.1. Communication between workers and management: individual vs. collective voice 4.1.2. Optimal level of codetermination: productivity enhancement vs. rent sharing 4.2. Unions and collective contracts 4.2.1. Union organization and importance across countries 4.2.2. Monopoly union wage setting and employment 4.2.3. Efficient wage bargaining and employment 4.3. Discussion: Pros and cons of collective worker representation. 4.4. Discussion: Why do some firms oppose the introduction of works councils (e.g., Schlecker), whereas in other firms employees do not want to establish works councils (e.g., SAP)? Der Übungsteil der Veranstaltung gliedert sich wie folgt: 1. Introduction to Research 1.1. How to find a research idea 1.2. How to find literature 1.3. How to structure paper and presentation Literature: Creedy, 2001, Starting research, Australian Economic Review 34, 116-124. Kramarz et al., 2006, How to do empirical economics, Investigaciones Económicas 30(2), 179-206. 2. Introduction to Econometrics with Personnel Data 2.1. Why use econometric tools? Importance of identifying causal effects of HRM practices 2.2. Data, Variables, and Methods 2.3. Interpretation of results 2.4. Real examples with personnel records in Stata 3. Own Econometric Case Studies 3.1. Pfeifer, C. (2010): Worker Absenteeism During and After Employment Probation: Evidence from German Personnel Data. Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik (forthcoming). 3.2. Pfeifer, C. (2008): An empirical note on wages in an internal labour market. Economics Letters 99(3): 570-573. 3.3. Pfeifer, C. (2010): Determinants of Promotions in an Internal Labour Market: Testing Implications from Tournament Theory and Efficient Allocation. Schmalenbachs Business Review (forthcoming). 3.4. Pfeifer, C. (2010): Impact of wages and job levels on worker absenteeism. International Journal of Manpower (forthcoming). 4. Student presentations and discussion of research papers in top journals 4.1. Pioneering study by Baker/Gibbs/Holmstrom Baker, G., Gibbs, M., Holmstrom, B. (1994a): The internal economics of the firm: evidence from personnel data. Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 881-919. Baker, G., Gibbs, M., Holmstrom, B. (1994b): The wage policy of a firm. Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 921-955. 4.2. Studies by Lazear Lazear, E.P. (1999): Personnel Economics: past lessons and future directions. Journal of Labor Economics 17, 199-236. Lazear, E.P. (2000a): The future of Personnel Economics. Economic Journal 110, F611-F639. Lazear, E.P. (2000b): Performance pay and productivity. American Economic Review 90, 1346-1361. 4.3. Studies on tournaments Audas, R., Barmby, T., Treble, J. (2004): Luck, effort, and reward in organizational hierarchy. Journal of Labor Economics 22, 379-395. Ehrenberg, R.G., Bognanno, M.L. (1990): Do tournaments have incentive effects? Journal of Political Economy 98, 1307-1324. Landers, R.M., Rebitzer, J.B., Taylor, L.J. (1996): Rat race redux: adverse selection in the determination of work hours in law firms. American Economics Review 86, 329-348. Taylor, B.A., Trogdon, J.G. (2002): Losing to win: tournament incentives in the National Basketball Association. Journal of Labor Economics 20, 23-41.

VWL Wahlfach: Kapital- und Wachstumstheorie (Vorlesung/Übung)

Dozent/in: Thomas Huth

Wirtschaftspolitik (Übung) (Übung)

Dozent/in:

Termin:
14-täglich | Freitag | 08:15 - 09:45 | 18.10.2010 - 04.02.2011 | C HS 3

Inhalt: begleitende Übung zur Vorlesung

Wirtschaftspolitik (Vorlesung) (Vorlesung)

Dozent/in: Thomas Wein

Inhalt: Aufbauend auf die mikroökonomischen Grundkenntnisse werden Grundlagen der Theorie des Marktversagens vermittelt. In der ersten Hälfte der Vorlesung werden ergänzende theoretische Konzepte vorgestellt. Diese Konzepte werden in der zweiten Hälfte der Vorlesung auf konkrete wirtschaftspolitische Handlungsfelder angewandt.

Vorlesungsverzeichnis

Lehrveranstaltungen

Personalökonomik (Vorlesung/Übung)

VWL Wahlfach: Kapital- und Wachstumstheorie (Vorlesung/Übung)

Wirtschaftspolitik (Übung) (Übung)

Wirtschaftspolitik (Vorlesung) (Vorlesung)