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Courses

Jan Söffner
“Cosmotechnics” is a complex term introduced by the philosopher Yuk Hui to counter technodeterminism while still accounting for the momentum of technological developments; to do justice to the cultural relativity of technology while simultaneously linking the “Ontological Turn” and its relativity to nature with the “question of technology” (Heidegger); to address planetary issues while also taking into account the human attitude toward technology. In this seminar, we will take up this concept, discuss it, and further develop it against the backdrop of other (complementary, contrasting, and related) theories. As complex as this theoretical approach may sound, the focal point of our reflections will be concrete questions of our present: such as the habitability of the world (Zimmermann), agency (Latour), shame in the face of superior technology (Anders), capitalist cosmotechnology (Zuboff), the public sphere (Arendt), or even the question of infrastructures (Bratton/Bridle) and AI architectures
Next appointment:
Tuesday, 2026-11-24 at 12:15
The development of artificial intelligence is proceeding so rapidly and has already become so extensively automated that even software developers are sometimes no longer able to predict how it will behave, let alone anticipate the challenges it will present to us. The development is taking on the form of a force of nature, one that we must confront in the same way we confront the forces of known nature: through experiments, test runs, and their interpretation. It is doubtful, however, that this strategy can lead to success in the long run, for how far would the natural sciences have come if they had been exposed to a nature undergoing exponentially accelerating change? It therefore makes sense to approach this subject instead from the perspective of philosophical theories, thought experiments, and even narrative thinking (science fiction has often predicted our present more accurately than scenarios); and that is what we aim to do in this seminar: AI ethics will e.g. be examined against the backdrop of responsibility (e.g., Lévinas), its intelligence against the backdrop of philosophical theories of thought, its political disruptions against that of the Nomos (Carl Schmitt), its social agency against the background of actor-networks (Bruno Latour), the “Singularity” against the theological backdrop of the Apocalypse etc. These approaches will be juxtaposed with approaches from engineering, information science, and the social sciences (such as socio-technical systems) and brought into dialogue with them.
Next appointment:
Wednesday, 2026-11-25 at 12:00
„We are doing this for 2400 years, and we are fine, thank you“ – war die Antwort eines Geisteswissenschaftlers auf den Vorwurf, dass seine Methoden nicht „wissenschaftlich“ seien. Ausgehend von der sokratischen Tradition der Hinterfragung stellt das Seminar die Frage, wann geisteswissenschaftliche Methoden einen Mehrwert haben, den andere Methoden nicht leisten können. Eine wichtige Rolle wird hierbei die Hermeneutik spielen, allerdings nicht als bloße Form- und Inhaltsdeutung von Kulturphänomenen verstanden, sondern auch eine Hermeneutik der Einfühlung (Theodor Lipps), des Vollzugs und Nachvollzugs (Matthias Vogel), der Partizipation (Günther Anders), und damit auch solcher Sinnphänomene, die sich nicht als Deutungsgegenstand alleine beschreiben lassen. Gerade in dieser Hinsicht steht das Seminar in der geisteswissenschaftlichen Tradition von Schleiermacher und Dilthey. Die Theorien werden allerdings nicht bereit und in ihrer ganzen Komplexität vorgestellt, sondern als Provokationen und Denkanstöße, um Denk-Wege zu verstehen, wissenschaftliches Argumentieren zu lernen und offene Fragen aufzuspüren.
Next appointment:
Thursday, 2026-12-03 at 10:15
The political, epistemic, legal, and economic order of our time still stems from the Gutenberg Galaxy. It is no wonder, then, that democracies, universities, the press, bureaucracies, the rule of law, and even the real economy - the hallmarks of what Max Weber described as “rationalization” - are in crisis. This seminar explores this crisis, seeking its causes and descriptive paradigms. The paper age, for example, established procedures for constructing reality through writing that referred to it: bookkeeping, contracts, legal texts, and so on. Today, however, we are entering a world defined by processes of smart optimization, control, gamification, generation, data extraction, and automation. And while the order of the Gutenberg Galaxy elevated rational subjectivity to decisive positions (democratic rule of law, for example, is based on parliamentary planning, discussion, the drafting and enactment of laws, judicial interpretation, and executive enforcement vis-à-vis citizens who could also choose to break the law - and it envisions a rational subject at each of these stages), such subjectivity now faces marginalization (algorithms in a smart city potentially write themselves, interpret themselves, act upon themselves, and ensure that rule violations cannot occur in the first place). The central thesis of the seminar will be that of a comprehensive virtualization resulting from digitization and the “Automation of Everything.” We will explore this through individual focus topics.
Next appointment:
Tuesday, 2026-11-24 at 16:15
Fast gleichzeitig stellten vor nunmehr 75 Jahren Alan Turing und Martin Heidegger ihre Theorien zum Denken dar. Während ersterer (im Aufsatz „Computing Machinery and Intelligence“) sämtliche geisteswissenschaftlichen Theorien nüchtern als unpraktikabel und unbelegbar abtat und die Frage nach dem Denken durch den nach ihm benannten Test beantworte (Denken ist, wenn ein unabhängiger Mensch es dafür hält), entwickelte letzterer (in der Vorlesung „Was heißt Denken“?) eine Theorie, die das Dasein sich selbst zur kontemplativen Erscheinung kommt. Inzwischen sind Maschinen entwickelt worden, die Turings Test erfüllen und deren Entwicklung von diesem Test geradezu programmiert worden ist. Damit gewinnen beide Ansätze nicht nur an Aktualität, sondern auch an Praktikabilität und Anschaulichkeit: Wenn es unbewusste Maschinen gibt, die aber trotzdem denken können und von denen wir uns auch unser Denken abnehmen lassen können, was heißt denken dann? Müssen wir uns vielleicht von dem Begriff verabschieden? Wie funktionieren diese Maschinen überhaupt, und was sagt das über unser eigenes ‚Denken‘? Wie unterscheiden sich künstliche Intelligenz ohne Bewusstsein und ohne Dasein vom Denken das Heidegger beschrieb? Im Seminar werden wir Philosoph:innen (von Meillassoux bis Arendt, von Gallagher bis Foucault) besprechen, um einen breiten, historischen wie systematischen Überblick über Zugänge zum Denken zu gewinnen.
Next appointment:
Wednesday, 2026-11-25 at 10:15